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HUNGARY 
 
ANDRÁS BÍRÓ-NAGY  
 
 
 
1. History 
 
In Hungary, the history of the left after the regime-change is essentially the history of 
a single party. Between 1990 and 2010, only the Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar 
Szocialista Párt, MSZP) declared itself the follower of social democratic values in the 
Hungarian Parliament. The MSZP not only became the dominant party in the 
Hungarian left, but it was also the electorally most successful party in the first 20 
years of modern Hungarian democracy. Since 1990, the socialists have won elections 
three times and governed the country for 12 years. These results would have seemed 
highly unlikely when the party was first founded.  
 
 
A difficult start: the successor party of the old regime 
 
The Hungarian Socialist Party was established on October 7, 1989 as the successor 
party of the former Hungarian Socialist and Workers Party (MSZMP). The main 
reason why the reformers of MSZMP decided to carry this moral burden and not 
break all ties with the old regime was the party’s infractructural background and its 
social embeddedness (Lakner 2011: 25). Yet in spite of legal continuity, a radical 
change took place in terms of political content. The MSZP accepted the framework of 
a pluralist democracy, ’humanised capitalism’ became its new economic and social 
policy goal, and the party declared itself a part of the Western European social 
democratic party family. The socialists aimed to advocate the interests of the 
employees, to reduce social inequalities, and increase social mobility (Bozóki 2004, 
Ripp 2004).  
  
 
Small party, big party, medium-sized party 
 
MSZP’s history since the first democratic elections can be divided into three stages. 
Between 1990 and 1994 the Socialists had to adjust to having a small party status, in 
which leaving the political quarantine set by all the other parties was the most 
important challenge. The second stage – the 1994-2008 period – was characterised by 
an MSZP that encompassed the entire left and which became the most successful 
political party in Hungary. Throughout these years, the Socialists relied on a liberal 
ally, the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) in forming coalition governments three 
times. The break with the liberals in spring 2008 can be considered the beginning of 
the third stage, in which the MSZP not only lacked any close allies in the party 
system, but – as the heavy defeats of the 2009 European Parliamentary and 2010 
general elections indicated – also lost its big party status. With the party’s vote share 
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hovering around roughly half of its pre-2007 size, reconstruction time for the 
Hungarian Socialists started from the state of a medium-sized party.  
 
 
The power of the expert image  
 
At the first elections in 1990, MSZP obtained less than 10 percent of the 
parliamentary seats and found itself in complete isolation for two years. In order to 
get out of the political ghetto, it was vital that the conservative-liberal cleavage 
proved to be more important than the anticommunist stance for the then biggest 
opposition party SZDSZ (Tóka 2005). The reapproachment between socialists and 
liberals was helped largely by the fact that there was common ground in numerous 
issues when it came to criticizing the conservative government and set the direction 
for the most crucial tasks in the future. MSZP politicians tended not to speak about 
the communist past – that would have been an uncomfortable task – and generally 
avoided ideological statements. The socialists rather decided to position themselves as 
the party of policy experts. ’Let competence govern the country’ was their campaign 
slogan in 1994, when MSZP won a landslide victory. This was not the first and last 
time when the expert image was on top spot among the party’s messages. The 1988-
1990 Németh government was also positioned as a cabinet of technocrats, while 
economic competence was a key factor in the election of Péter Medgyessy in 2002 as 
well the preferred self-presentation of the ’expert government’ of Gordon Bajnai in 
2009-2010.    
 
 
External and internal struggle with liberals  
 
The second and longest stage in MSZP history not only brought constant struggle 
with the stable coalition partner SZDSZ, but the social democratic-liberal cleavage 
also generated tensions within the Socialist Party. In terms of policy content, the 
challenge was not easy for the Socialists in government. Voter expectations regarding 
social security had to be met, while the markets, international institutions and SZDSZ 
pushed the party towards liberal economic policy in order to stabilize Hungary’s 
economic situation. As László Andor (2010) demonstrated, the economic policy of 
MSZP was mostly under the influence of liberal-leaning economists for the last 20 
years. Contentwise, this was the roots of many infights and many socialist politicians 
supported their government’s economic measures and various reforms only half-
heartedly. PM Gyula Horn (1994-1998) fired his finance minister Lajos Bokros in 
1996 immediately after the end of Bokros’ financial stabilization programme, with the 
aim to ease tough austerity. In 2002, Péter Medgyessy initiated a Keynesian shift in 
MSZP’s economic policies, which proved electorally popular but fiscally 
unsustainable and prompted the introduction of an austerity program after the MSZP-
SZDSZ coalition was reelected in the 2006 election. Between 2006-2008, PM Ferenc 
Gyurcsány’s liberal health and higher education reforms were, however, largely 
rejected even by his own party. PM Gordon Bajnai’s crisis management programme, 
implemented after the global financial crisis eliminated any hope of a recovery from 
the popularity drops of 2006-2008, was considered necessary by MSZP, but was not 
popular within the party and there is no doubt that the socialists would have chosen a 
more socially responsive path if they had had any other option.     
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The standard account of why the MSZP became popular and the dominant party on 
the left in the 1990s is that those who thought that the regime transition caused more 
insecurity, growing unemployment and poverty, considered the socialists the political 
force that could bring back security and stability in their lives. It is telling that 71 
percent of MSZP voters hoped the return of the ’positive characteristics’ of the old 
regime in 1994 (Bokor 1995: 543). While the MSZP was in government, especially in 
1994-1998 and after 2006, it the party followed an agenda that promoted 
privatization, foreign direct investment, and economic opening in general. As a 
consequence, the relationship between left-wing economics and MSZP weakened in 
the eyes of the voters. The opportunity opened up for other political parties to attack 
MSZP from the a statist and less pro-business economic platform, and culturally 
conservative and arch-rival Fidesz lived with this chance. 
 
Interestingly, Hungary’s quasi two-party system of 2000-2008, with its ’frozen’ party 
supply (Enyedi 2007) did not reflect standard European party profiles – at least not in 
economic policy. In opposition, right-wing Fidesz became defender of left-wing 
economic goals, while MSZP was arguing for a smaller state, more competition and 
privatisation. Survey data of the Hungarian Election Studies in 2009 showed that 
MSZP’s left-wing identity was questioned by many. According to this research, 62 
percent of the voters thought that MSZP was the party of the elite and only 25 percent 
agreed that the socialists represented the workers and the poor. These attitudes explain 
why Fidesz managed to win a ’social referendum’ against the government in March 
2008, making it impossible that the socialist-liberal coalition could introduce new 
user fees in higher education and health. The political defeat of liberal reforms led to 
the breakup with SZDSZ and brought in a new era for the socialists.  
 
 
Starting again by winning back the comfort zone 
 
After 2008, MSZP was not considered a big party any more and its comprehensive 
defeat in the upcoming 2010 election was taken for granted. The disappearance of 
SZDSZ from the Hungarian party system also made it easier that the socialist break 
definitely with the era marked by a pro-liberal orientation. Medium-sized MSZP aims 
to win back its comfortzone by a leftist turn. The right-wing government’s policies 
explicitly favour the high income segments of the society and leave the left-wing 
economic position relatively open for opposition parties. The main goal of the party’s 
current president, Attila Mesterházy (2010-) is to attract those to the socialists who 
are unsatisfied with rising poverty, reject the newly introduced flat tax system, and the 
decreasing opportunities for social mobility. Solidarity, social justice and labour 
rights are the key themes for the new MSZP leadership. In October 2011, the social 
democratic-liberal struggle was also finished within the party leadership with the 
departure of former PM Gyurcsány from MSZP and the emergence of his own party, 
the Democratic Coalition.  
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2. Organization 
 
The Hungarian Socialist Party was established as the alliance of various power 
centres and it has preserved its poliarhical character ever since. It has never occured in 
the history of MSZP that all power would have concentrated in the hands of one 
leader – not even when the socialist party leader and the prime minister was the same 
person (Gyula Horn in 1994-1998 and Ferenc Gyurcsány in 2007-2009). Because of 
the balanced intra-party power relationships, from an organisational perspective 
MSZP can be best described as a ’party of permanent bargain’ (Lakner 2011).  
 
 
2.1. Closer to the members: a radical reform of the party statutes 
 
It is of the main goals of current MSZP president, Attila Mesterházy, to bring the 
leadership closer to the members by a radical reform of the party statutes (MSZP 
2011a). In order to provide more memberhsip legitimacy to the party leaders, from 
November 2011 it is compulsory to collect the recommendation – practically 
signatures – of 10 percent of the membership nationally and within a county, to 
become a MSZP presidential candidate and a county leader, respectively. Candidates 
in single member constituencies must gain the support of at least ten percent of the 
registered supporters within the electoral district to qualify, while the prime 
ministerial candidate (election ticket leader) of the party is expected to achieve the 
same rate nationally. This system favours those politicians who are well embedded in 
the party structure and significantly reduces the chances of outsiders. Taking into 
account that the last three prime ministers of MSZP came from outside of the formal 
party hierarchy – either from private business or a political advisory role –, this 
change is of great importance.  
 
A further significant change in the MSZP statutes influences the rules of choosing 
delegates for the party congress. According to the new party law, the number of 
delegates from a county will not be decided on the basis of party membership but of 
the number of residents in a county. Local party budgets are also set in line with the 
number of residents. The party’s mesosphere, the county leaders, may loose much of 
their influence not because of organisational changes but  Hungary’s new electoral 
system. According to the new election law passed by the right, mandates can only be 
won in single member constituencies and on national party lists, and the party lists for 
counties, the so far safe haven for county leaders, will disappear.  
 
The MSZP started the 2010-2014 parliamentary cycle with 59 seats out of 386 in the 
Hungarian Parliament. After the departure of former Speaker of the House, Katalin 
Szili in 2010, and the foundation of Ferenc Gyurcsány’s Democratic Coalition party, 
the parliamentary group of MSZP consists of 48 MPs in 2012. Though narrowly, but 
the MSZP parliamentary group is still the biggest among the opposition parties. The 
leader of the parliamentary group and the president of the party is the same person, 
the 38-year old Attila Mesterházy. The MSZP parliamentary group’s operative leader 
is the faction director József Tóbiás, whose work is helped by three deputy leaders of 
the parliamentary group.  
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2.2. Where crucial decisions are made: National Presidium and the Party Congress 
 
The National Presidium is the leading organ of the MSZP (Figure 1). The president of 
the party, the deputy president, the two vice-presidents, the leader of the 
parliamentary group are automatically nominated, while the rest of the 11-15 
members are elected by the party congress. The congress not only appoints the leaders 
of the party, but – as the major decision-making forum – also decides about the party 
list for parlamentary elections, the presidential and prime ministerial candidates, 
approves the party manifesto and amendments of the party statute. Strategic and 
public policy oversight is exercised by the Party Assembly. Delegates to the party 
congress are sent by local party units. The autonomy of the local level is considerable 
in the internal life of MSZP. This is where decisions are made about the candidates 
for single member constituencies at both general and local elections, and mayoral 
candidates and party lists for local elections. The power of the local level and the 
party membership in general should not be underestimated: congressional delegates 
turned against the national party leadership and made Ferenc Gyurcsány prime 
minister instead of Péter Kiss, the Presidium’s favourite, in 2004.  
 
Figure 1. The multi-level party organization 
 
 
Source: MSZP, www.mszp.hu 
 
 
2.3. Ageing membership but substantial organisation 
At the end of 2011 MSZP had 30,000 members, that is 9,000 less than the socialist 
membership ten years earlier but sufficient to find and nominate candidates in any 
partisan election nationwide (Table 1).  MSZP lost only a few hundred members due 
to the fact that former PM Gyurcsány quit the party, and is still the second strongest 
party organisation behind the governing conservative party, Fidesz. The proportion of 
men in the membership is quite high, 63% in 2011, though appreciably lower than a 
decade ago (69%). 
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Table 1. The evolution of MSZP’s party membership, 2000-2011  Years	   Number	  of	  members	   Membership	  (%	  of	  electorate)	  2000	   39000	   0,5%	  2011	   30000	   0,38%	  
Source: MSZP 2011, p. 12-13. 
The average age of the MSZP membership, 55,9 years, is the oldest of all 
parliamentary parties in Hungary, and two years higher than the average socialist 
member’s age was ten years earlier (MSZP 2011b) and seven years older than in 
1990: i.e., at least the pace of the members’ aging dropped. In general, MSZP 
members are quite highly educated: 40 percent of the party members hold higher 
education degrees and further 25 percent finished high school (Table 2).   
 
Table 2. The sociology of MSZP’s party membership, 2000-2011  
Years Sociological profile 
2000 Max. 8 classes of primary school (23%) 
Vocational school/Technical school (11%) 
Secondary school (31%) 
University/college degree (35%) 
2011 Max. 8 classes of primary school (21%) 
Vocational school/Technical school (14%) 
Secondary school (25%) 
University/college degree (40%) 
Source: MSZP 2011, p. 14. 
 
 
 
3. Electoral results 
 
The Hungarian Socialist Party was the biggest vote-getter in all national elections 
since between 1990 and 2010 save the two dramatic electoral defeats that started and 
ended this period (see Table 3). With the exception of 1990 – when the socialists 
achieved merely 10,89% and a fourth place overall -, MSZP finished either first or 
second at the general elections. The socialists came out of the post-communist ghetto 
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in 1994 by winning almost 33% of the votes and 54% of the seats. This was the only 
occasion when the MSZP could have commanded a majority in government alone, but 
decided to invite the liberals in a coalition to gain more legitimacy both among 
Hungarian voters and international institutions. In terms of party list votes, MSZP 
achieved a similiar result to 1994 in 1998, but despite this fact lost the latter election. 
The reason behind this can be found in the radical transformation of the conservative 
side. While MSZP, as the party of the united left faced an easy race with the 
fragmented right in 1994, the alliance of right-wing parties was able to win against the 
socialists in the second round of the 1998 elections.   
The 2002 election saw an intensely fought campaign and the highest turnout (70,5% 
and 73% in the first and second rounds, respectively) in post-communist Hungarian 
politics. MSZP got the highest number of votes in its history (2,36 million votes) and 
narrowly won the 2002 elections ahead of the right-wing incumbents. In 2006, the 
race was similarly tight between the two big blocs, and, once again, MSZP managed 
to win one percent more of the votes than the conservative rival. The 2006 election 
marked the peak of the concentration of the Hungarian party system: 85% of the 
voters chose either MSZP or Fidesz. The two parties were so evenly balanced in both 
2002 and 2006 that the liberals obtained a pivotal role in government formation both 
times despite the fact that even their parliamentary presence – the passing of the 5 
percent legal threshold – was in danger both in 2002 and 2006. The MSZP’s re-
election in 2006 was a surprise because of two reasons. First, the socialists were 
behind Fidesz since the summer of 2003 in all polls and overtook their rivals only in 
the last two months of the campaign. Second, no party had managed to get re-elected 
in the post-communist region beforehand.  
 
Table 3. Election results of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), 2000-2012 Years	   Legislative	  elections	   (1st	  round)	  (%)	   Seats	   (number	  and	   %	   in	   the	  Parliament)	   European	  elections	  (%)	   Seats	   (number	  and	   %	   of	   all	  Hungary	  seats)	  2002	   42,05	   178	  (46,11)	   	   	  2004	   	   	   34,3	   9	  (37,5)	  2006	   43,21	   190	  (49,22)	   	   	  2009	   	   	   17,37	   4	  (16,67)	  2010	   19,3	   59	  (15,28)	   	   	  
Source: National Election Office, Hungary, www.valasztas.hu 
 
After the peak: downward spiral till the 2010 elections 
Only a few months after the historic 2006 elections victory, MSZP’s support suffered 
the most significant decline of the last ten years due to the austerity measures adopted 
by the Gyurcsány government. PM Gyurcsány’s leaked ’Őszöd speech’, in which he 
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admitted that he lied about the state of the country to win the elections, cemented the 
loss of popularity and took away the hope of a political recovery. A slow, gradual 
erosion of support characterized the 2006-2010 parliamentary term after the dramatic 
developments of 2006. This process led first to the resignation of Gyurcsány in 2009 
and a massive electoral defeat in 2010. The unpopular and politically defeated 
reforms in health and education, the 2008 ’social referendum’ initiated by the right-
wing oppositon, the global economic crisis, a heavy defeat at the 2009 European 
Parliamentary elections and several corruption scandals in the second half of the term 
were the key points of MSZP’s downward spiral (Beck, Bíró Nagy and Róna 2011). 
At the 2010 elections – when Fidesz won more than two-thirds of the mandates – 
MSZP lost 58% of its 2006 voters and the 19,3% of the votes was merely enough to 
win the race for the position of the leading opposition party ahead of newcomer 
radical right party, Jobbik (16,7%). Since then, MSZP’s support has increased, 
although not substantially: MSZP remained in the sphere of medium-sized parties 
since 2010. The socialists could count with 25-30% of the active voters in 2012, still 
behind the governing right-wing Fidesz party in the polls.  
 
Table 4. Government participation of MSZP, 2000-2012  
Years Government/Opposition 
1998-2002 Opposition 
2002-2006 Government (coalition) 
2006-2010 Government (coalition) 
2010-2014 Opposition 
Source: National Election Office, Hungary, www.valasztas.hu 
 
 
Sociology of the MSZP electorate  
 
Geographically, there has been two key factors of electoral success for the socialists: 
a strong result in the most disadvantaged counties in North-Eastern Hungary, and a 
landslide victory in the relatively affluent capital city, Budapest. The key role of the 
latter can be underlined by the fact that MSZP won 28 out of 32 Budapest districts in 
the very tight electoral races of both 2002 and 2006. In 2010, the socialists lost the 
most in the North-Eastern counties – in Borsod and Szabolcs counties MSZP got 
more than 30 percentage points less than in 2006 – and it seems very likely that there 
is no way back to power for the socialists without winning back the ’crisis regions’ of 
the North-East.  
 
At the local level, the socialists managed to win the majority of the main mayoral 
positions (Budapest, districts of Budapest, major cities) only once, in 2002. At the 
height of its popularity, MSZP won 29 of the 46 most important local offices in the 
country. Right after the change of regime, in 1990 the socialists had no mayors in 
these key municipalities at all, while in 1994, 1998 and 2006 they won in just 11, 17 
and 19 of them, respectively. MSZP’s decline after 2006 is also reflected in its 2010 
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local elections results, when socialist mayoral candidates only four of these mayoral 
position (in three Budapest districts and a single provincial city, Szeged).  
MSZP’s electorate is much less educated than its party membership (Table 5). 34 
percent of their voters have finished primary school or less. Therefore it is no surprise 
that the socialists are the strongest among the less priviliged segments of the society. 
Only 16 per cent of the MSZP voters have obtained a degree in higher education. 
Ageing of their voters is a huge challenge for the Socialists: more than two-thirds of 
the MSZP supporters are above 45, and 43 per cent are above 60 (MSZP 2011b).  
 
Table 5. The sociology of MSZP’s electorate, 2011  
Years Sociological profile 
2011 Max. 8 classes of primary school (34%) 
Vocational school/Technical school (24%) 
Secondary school (26%) 
University/college degree (16%) 
Source: MSZP 2011, p. 11. 
 
 
 
4. Relationship with other parties and social movements 
 
4.1. The liberal allies are no more  
 
The Hungarian Socialist Party had no rival on the left between 1990 and 2010. The 
single potential ally of MSZP was a liberal party, SZDSZ that took part in all 
Socialist-led governments from 1994 to 2008. As it was noted in previous parts, there 
were numerous policy differences between the two sides (privatisation, more choice 
in public services, taxation, welfare spending), but cultural liberalism and the fierce 
rejection of the main political rival – within the framework of ’antiorbanism’, 
referring to Fidesz-leader Viktor Orbán – brought the two parties into an alliance. The 
relationship between socialists and liberals was never perfect, but the negative 
feelings towards the liberals led to a rupture only during the second Gyurcsány 
government, after 2006. This was the period when the socialist PM – who found Tony 
Blair’s third way approach quite sympathetic – put several liberal reform goals into 
the centre of his agenda. The socialists and even Gyurcsány turned against the liberal 
reform agenda after the ’social referendum’ that the MSZP lost, and the prime 
minister fired his liberal health minister. As a reaction, the liberals left the coalition 
and the socialists governed the second half of the parliamentary term with a minority 
government. The liberals failed to reach the five percent threshold in the 2009 EP 
elections, were unable to run independently in the 2010 general elections and became 
completely marginalised afterwards. 
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4.2. New potential allies: Greens, civic movements and the Gyurcsány-party  
 
The Hungarian party system went through radical changes in 2010 (Enyedi and 
Benoit 2011). Besides the disappearance of two old parties (SZDSZ and the moderate 
conservative MDF), two new parties entered the Hungarian Parliament. Both new 
political forces, the radical right Jobbik and the green-left LMP, based their strategy 
on attacking the socialist governments. However, the socialists have repeatedly 
signalled in the last two years that they look at the greens – a small opposition party, 
with five to ten percent public support – as potential future allies. The fact that MSZP 
unilaterally withdrew four of its candidates from the runoff in the 2010 general 
elections to support LMP politicians was a clear proof for that.   
 
Since Hungary’s new electoral law clearly favours big party blocs and disadvantages 
fragmented political sides, it seems to be certain that the green-left LMP must look 
into the opportunities of an electoral alliance with MSZP if they are keen on changing 
government. The socialists show openness towards the civic movements that have 
emerged from the anti-government mass demonstrations since 2010. Though it is not 
clear if the new extra-parliamentary left, composed of the trade unionist Solidarity 
movement, the One Million for the Freedom of Press! movement and former PM 
Bajnai’s Haza és Haladás are to take part in the next elections as political parties 
(their joint movement ’Együtt 2014’, established in October 2012, is a sign of that), 
MSZP would most probably be open to co-operate with them. While former PM 
Gyurcsány’s Democratic Coalition is no longer a faction within MSZP, both 
Mesterházy and Gyurcsány emphasised that they consider a future electoral alliance 
possible. On the whole, despite the many potential allies, MSZP is currently alone in 
the party system. Nevertheless, the willingness to co-operate is there, MSZP is 
determined to integrate the opposition parties and movements into one anti-
government bloc and act as its leading force.     
 
 
 
5. Relation to power and institutions 
 
Because of the burden of being the successor party of the single political force of the 
old regime, the Hungarian Socialist Party has always considered vital to prove its 
commitment to democracy. It has always been a top priority to avoid that political 
rivals could accuse MSZP that it would try to restore the old system. Besides 
democracy, a pro-Western foreign policy has been the other pillar of its politics. As a 
consequence, MSZP became an enthusiastic promoter of European integration and a 
defender of the democratic order. 
 
A good example for self-moderation and democratic commitment was 1994, when the 
socialists looked for a coalition partner in a situation in which they could have formed 
a government alone. Paradoxically, it was not the successor party of the old regime, 
but the liberal-turned-conservative Fidesz that has been accused repeatedly of 
disrespecting the democratic institutional system of Hungary. In the last two decades, 
MSZP has opposed the centralisation and authoritarian moves of Fidesz, a party that 
was originally established in 1988 to bring down an authoritarian regime. At the party 
leader level, MSZP flirted with the personalisation trends seen in Fidesz when 
Gyurcsány served as the party’s prime minister
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socialists in general rarely look for a strong leader, the party is rather characterized by 
collective leadership and permanent bargaigning.  
 
 
 
6. Programatic positioning 
 
The Hungarian Socialist Party started the 2010 election campaign with a new 
candidate, Attila Mesterházy, and a new programme. Though the electoral defeat was 
sure long before the campaign, the party manifesto is of great significance for this 
study, as it already showed the direction the party would take in opposition: a leftist 
turn. 
 
 
6.1. Socio-economic issues 
 
The main messages of the party manifesto aimed to keep and mobilize the hardcore 
voters with left-wing economic campaign promises. The document contained a lot of 
self-criticism and declared a radical change compared to the Gyurcsány-era. ’It was 
the complete failure of neoliberalism what happened’ (MSZP 2010: 3) – this was 
stated in the introductory part of the manifesto, clearly referring both to the economic 
crisis and the socialist-liberal governments. By a clear commitment to a strong state, 
full employment and helping the poorer segments of the society, MSZP positioned 
itself where its voters were in terms of economic policy (Bíró Nagy 2011). A single 
manifesto is clearly not enough to rebuild the loosened or even broken ties between 
the party and its 2006 voters all at once, but it indicated the intention of the socialists 
at least.   
 
A comparison of the attitudes of MSZP MPs and voters demonstrates that the socialist 
voting base is fundamentally paternalist, which is in some cases against the position 
of the party elite (Bíró Nagy 2011). Socialist MPs tend to disagree with the statements 
that the ’government should create jobs for all’ and ’there should be no tuition fees in 
higher education at all’. However, the party manifesto rather reflected the 
expectations of the voters and not the conviction of the party elite. Despite this fact, it 
can be expected that MSZP’s official commitment to a strong state will be a stable 
policy position, as the party has already experienced the negative effects in public 
support of leaving the economic left.  
 
 
6.2. Cultural liberalism 
 
Both MSZP MPs and voters are culturally liberal in the sense that they are very 
secular, and support the complete separation of state and church. A further policy 
field – in which a liberal approach could even pay off – is gender equality (for 
example the party’s commitment to abolish the gender pay gap). The attitudes of 
politicians suggest that on gender issues the left-right divide is consistent with the 
liberal-conservative content represented by the main political parties, and that not 
only MSZP supporters but the majority of Hungarians also stand close to the position 
of socialist politicians.  
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6.3. Ecological issues 
 
In 2010, environmental issues were a must-have for all parties. MSZP politicians and 
voters share the same opinion on this topic. They are aware of the importance of 
green issues, but are not the most committed supporters. This attitude is reflected in 
the party manifesto: the environmental statements are rather generalities, specific 
promises are only made regarding energy efficiency and renewable energy. Since the 
election of Mesterházy as leader of the party, sustainability and environmental 
awareness got much more attention as these issues are considered common ground for 
a potential co-operation with the green-left LMP.  
 
 
6.4. Europe 
 
Since the MSZP has been strong supporter of Hungary’s European integration for the 
last 20 years, it is not surprising that the socialists stood up for the integration process 
in the 2010 party manifesto as well. ’We stand for both further enlargement and a 
deeper integration’ (MSZP 2010: 40) – this is not only the official line nailed down in 
the manifesto but also the opinion of the party elite. The MSZP parliamentary group 
is the Hungarian Parliament’s most EU-friendly fraction. Socialist voters also support 
European integration, but not to the degree as their MPs do. The reason of the 
moderate support lies in the fact that Eurosceptic voters are found in the MSZP camp 
as well: 20 per cent of socialist voters would quit the European Union (Policy 
Solutions – Medián 2010).  
 
 
6.5 A controversial issue: the roma minority 
 
As it was mentioned above, the most severe coherence problem between the 
manifesto and MSZP voters was not on economic issues in 2010. The clearest 
contradiction is found in the judgement of the Roma issue. Anti-Roma sentiments are 
quite common among MSZP voters – in this respect there is no significant difference 
between left and right in Hungary. In spite of this, the socialist MPs  and the party 
manifesto reject all forms of discrimination and social exclusion. However, there are 
some signs that the socialists tried to react to the rising ethnic tension in their North-
Eastern Hungary strongholds and that MSZP ceased supporting the liberal approach 
on minority issues. The party manifesto criticises political correctness and expects 
efforts from the Roma minority as well: ’the society of the minority should respect the 
norms followed by the majority of the society’ (MSZP 2010: 24).  
 
 
7. Intra-party life 
Ideological platforms are important actors in MSZP’s intra-party life. These factions 
hold those – at least 300 – party members together who share the same opinion in 
most issues. A party member is allowed to join only one platform, and non-party 
	   13	  
member supporters cannot enter these intra-party groups. Six platforms operate within 
the Hungarian Socialist Party. Party leader Attila Mesterházy’s Third Wave Platform 
is considered the most influential. Platforms represent the ideological diversity of the 
party. While the main goal of the Leftist Grouping Platform – a group closely 
connected to the trade unions – is democratic socialism, the People’s Platform is for 
the reduction of regional differences and the improvement of quality of life in rural 
Hungary, and the Reason and Responsibility Platform stands for liberal economic 
policy and post-materialist values. Despite the ideological differences, open races for 
the leading positions are rare within the Socialist party. There have been only two 
cases out of the six last party congresses, when there were even more than one 
competitor for the position of the President (Table 6).  
 
Table 6. Results of the MSZP party congresses, 2000-2012  Years	   Candidate	  	  (%)	   Candidate	  (%)	   Leader	  2012	   Attila	  Mesterházy	  (69)	   Tibor	  Szanyi	  (31)	   Attila	  Mesterházy	  2010	   Attila	  Mesterházy	  (87)	   -­‐	  	   Attila	  Mesterházy	  2009	   Ildikó	  Lendvai	  (91)	   -­‐	  	   Ildikó	  Lendvai	  2007	   Ferenc	  Gyurcsány	  (89)	   -­‐	  	   Ferenc	  Gyurcsány	  2004	   István	  Hiller	  (72)	   Imre	  Szekeres	  (28)	   István	  Hiller	  2003	   László	  Kovács	  (93)	   -­‐	   László	  Kovács	  
Source: MSZP, www.mszp.hu  
 
Before October 2011, a strategic dilemma divided Gyurcsány’s Democratic Coalition 
Platform from the other platforms. Mesterházy and the six platforms imagined MSZP 
as a social democratic mass party that is open to co-operation with other opposition 
parties. Gyurcsány’s goal was to turn the Socialist Party into an umbrella party in 
which liberal and moderate conservative politicians would have been also welcome. 
The power struggle between Mesterházy and Gyurcsány ended with the victory of 
Mesterházy in October 2011 and it is not in question any more that MSZP bases its 
strategy on the credible representation of social democratic values.  
However, intra-party cleavages are still there, and the most important of them is 
generational. At the November 2011 party congress Mesterházy asked those socialist 
politicians who held important government positions between 2002 and 2010 to step 
back and provide opportunities for a new generation. The differentiation between old 
and new faces might cause futher internal tensions in the Socialist Party, especially in 
light of the new Hungarian electoral law that reduces the number of MPs from 386 to 
199. As a consequence, old and new politicians will probably fight for less potential 
positions – and even more so if MSZP would nominate joint candidates with other 
opposition movements.    
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8. Conclusion 
 
The biggest opportunity for an MSZP comeback lies in the overall popularity of social 
democratic values in Hungary. The socialists’ credibility in representing solidarity, 
social justice and social mobility has suffered in the last few years. However, if the 
party is able to be more in line with the expectations of its potential voters, there is a 
chance for strengthening. Since a fragmentation process has started on the left since 
2010, it has been a strategic dilemma for MSZP whether they focus on obtaining the 
leading role in a left-wing, anti-government coalition, or try to beat Fidesz without 
any allies. After all, this dilemma is likely to be decided by the polls: if the socialists 
are not able to catch up with Fidesz in the polls, co-operation is surely needed in order 
to win elections in the future. What seems to be sure however, is that MSZP remains 
the major force on the left for a long time, without it, the formation of a non-
conservative goverment in Hungary is impossible.  
Important strengths that might help the Hungarian Socialist Party during its 
reconstruction time are its still notable membership and its strong infrastructural 
background. Therefore, not only its relatively high public support, but also its strong 
organisation might ensure MSZP’s leading role in a future left-wing alliance. The 
existence of MSZP-friendly media channels, a good financial background compared 
to other opposition movements, well-established international relations, party 
foundations and think-tanks also provide a solid basis to the reconstruction of the 
party.  
In government, not only MSZP’s left-wing identity but also its competence was 
questioned. For this reason, it is crucial to put special emphasis on policy work and 
come up with a credible social democratic alternative. This might help the socialists 
to reduce the number of those who would ’never vote for MSZP’ – the rejection of the  
socialists’ is still the highest of all parliamentary parties in 2012. In times of economic 
crisis, the improving perception of the last socialist-led, ’crisis management 
government’ and the worsening public assessment of the conservative government’s 
performance might be also helpful in rebuilding trust in the party’s competence.   
MSZP politicians often speak about the existence of a wide variety of opinions within 
the party in a positive context. However, a different interpretation is also possible: the 
Hungarian Socialist Party is the party of constant infights, in which leading politicians 
do not struggle with each other behind the scenes, but in the media. To finish off party 
infights and step up in a united way, so that the party could focus on the critics of the 
government and presenting its own proposals, is indispensable. 
A further weakness of the socialists is that they have failed to appeal to young voters 
in recent years. Not only MSZP’s membership but its voting base as well, is not 
sustainable in demographic terms. 43% of MSZP voters is above 60 and no more than 
15% fall within the 18-29 age group (MSZP 2011b). This situation is unlikely to 
improve with the same old politicians who represented the party in the last twenty 
years or even during the 2002-2010 period. Many of them are still MPs in the 2010-
14 term. The further renewal of the Hungarian Socialist Party’s elite is a prerequisite 
to becoming attractive to most voters again.  
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